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MlIAMI L.ilt" QUART'ERLY
not. Mlinor children remain at all times wards of the Court, in
custody proceedings.
It appears most inequitable that the mother was not at least granted
:4 more f.'Vorable decree, say a three months period of visitation. She is
L-titled to enjoy her society for a reasonably sufficient time each year
to enable her to inculcate in her mind a spirit of love, affection and
respect for her mother.' 0
Courts being jealous of their jurisdiction, one wonders if the same
result would have been reached had the mother remained domiciled in
Florida rather than Michigan. In any event, the decision in the instant
case is at variance with the great weight of authority, and cannot be
reconciled with earlier Florida cases. It certainly is not in accord with
modern social doctrines.
I0 Frazier v, Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 147 So. 464 (1933). Where evidence
showed neither of divorced parents had superior qualifications for exer-
cising parental rights, modifying decree awarding custody of 11 year
old female child so as to exclude father except for two weeks each year
held erroneous in not permitting father child's custody for not less than
three months.
TAXATION-LAND EXEMPT WHERE NO
BENEFITS RECEIVED5
The Florida Supreme Court recently held that where agricultural
lands included within municipal boundaries receive no benefits, direct
or indirect, from the municipality other than from its water works, the
enforcement of municipal taxes on the lands other than for debt service
on the water works bonds may be enjoined. 1
The effect of the principal case is that agricultural lands within a
municipality are taxable only if, and to the extent that, they receive
municipal benefits. This is presumably based on the minority rule that
municipal taxation of property which cannot be benefited by municipal
expenditures is a taking of private property for public purposes and may
be enjoined.2 In two of the small minority of states recognizing this
theory it has been overruled as unsatisfactory and impracticable) As
was pointed out in a New Jersey case,* "If the matter of benefits to the
* Town of Lake Hamilton v. Hughes, 32 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1947).
ISee Note*, supra.
2 Langworthy v. Dubuque 16 Iowa 271 (1864); Territory v. Daniels
6 Utah 288, 22 Pac. 159, 5 L.R.A. 444 (1889) since overruled see (before
constitution adopted) Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 398, 57
Pae. 1, 45 L.R.A. 628 (1899); Town of Parkland v. Gaines, Same v.
Drown, 88 Ky. 562, 11 SW 649 (1889) since overruled see Hughes v.
Carl et. at., 106 Ky. 533, 50 SW 852 (1899); Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa
A2 1859).
3 Kimball v. Grantsville City, supra. Hughes v. Carl, supra.




taxpayer becomes a judicial problem the courts cannot halt at the line
of no benefit in dealing with general tax levies. The logical result of
judicial intervention at all carries the boundary of supervision into all
degrees of benefit. . . . Nor can there be any logical distinction between
property which the court may think to be inadequately benefited and
property which it may deem to be the recipient of no benefit. The sup-
posed wrong to the taxpayer . . . in both instances is identical in kind."
The question of taxability of lands, with the infrequent exception of
cases of abuse of legislative authority,5 is for the legislature rather thanx
for the courts. It has been held that without valid legislative authority-
no municipality has power to exempt taxable property within its limits
from local taxation. 6 The case under consideration seems to be the
first in which Florida has departed from the general rule that property
within the limits of a municipal corporation is subject to municipal tax-
ation, even though it is so situated that it does not and cannot receive
any benefit frim the money so paid as taxes,7 to the extent of saying
that the courts are to be permitted to determine taxability of land
where there is no clear abuse of legislative authority.
Reason indicates that Florida should return to the general rule sip-
ported by a far greater weight of authority. Thus it would avoid the
confusion and impracticability of a judicial determination of a presence
or abuse of municipal benefits to unimproved lands.
s Land, Log, .& Lumber Co. et. a]. v. Brown et. al., 73 Wis. 294, 40 NW
482, 3 L.R.A. 472 (1888); Sharp's executor v. Dunavan, 17 B. Mon. 223
(Ky.) (1856); William T. Martin v. William Dix, 52 Miss. 63, 24 Am.
R ep. 661 (1876); Davis v. Town of Point Pleasant, 32 W. Va. 289, 9
SE 228 (1889); Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. 170, 27 Am..Rep. 633 (1877);
State ex rel. Davis, Attorney General et. at, v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla.
69, 120 So. 335, 64 A.L.R. 1307 (1929); Lintor v. Athens, 53 Ga. 588
(1876).
6 City of Tampa v. Kaunitz, 39 Fla. 683, 23 So. 416 (1898); Hayes v.
Walker, 54 Fla. 183, 44 So. 747 (1907).
7 Kimball v. Grantsville City, supra; Callen v. City of Junction City,
43 Kansas 627, 23 Pac. 652, 7 L.R.A. 736 (1890).
TAXATION-MUNICIPAL TAX ASSESSMENTS
ENDANGERED*
In a recent action for the foreclosure of certain tax liens, the Stiprelnm
Court of Florida reversed a final decree of foreclosure rendered by the
Circuit Court of Jefferson -County, and ruled that there was no valid
levy and assessment of certain municipal taxes by the town (if Moiti-
*Certain Lots Upon Which Taxes Are Delinquent et al. v. Town of
Monticello, 31 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1947)-(Decree of Circuit Court affirmed
on first hearing; reversed on rehearing).
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